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While economists agree that investment has a positive effect on economic growth,
they have not produced a consensus on whether public or private investment has a
larger impact on economic activity and whether there is a link between the two. A
frequently cited study by Aschauer [1989] highlighted the importance of public invest-
ment, indicating that the decline in public infrastructure spending explains large part
of the productivity slowdown in the US economy in 1980s. Following this study, there
has been a growing body of literature that investigates whether public investment
leads to an increase in output growth and/or the productivity of private capital [e.g.,
Munnell, 1990; Khan and Reinhart, 1990; Barro, 1990; Easterly and Rebelo, 1993;
Tatom, 1991, 1993; Evans and Karras, 1994a,b; Ramirez, 1998; Khan and Kumar,
1997]. The hypothesis has been tested either directly, using a neoclassical production
function where public capital enters as a separate input, or indirectly by looking at the
productivity of private capital and labor, and the rate of return to private capital de-
rived from the production function. Overall, the empirical evidence from the US and
from developing countries suggests that private capital is more productive than public
investment, and that although public investment contributes to the productivity of
private capital, it does not explain the major part of the variation in output growth.
The finding that public investment contributes less to overall productivity than
private investment does not necessarily undermine the role of public investment,
because public investment may increase productivity indirectly by enhancing the pro-
ductivity of private capital. For example, public infrastructure expenditures may be
complementary to private investment. Another approach to examining the effect of
public investment on economic growth and productivity is, therefore, to test the hy-
potheses that public investment either promotes or displaces private investment by
specifying a private investment model. There have been a small number of studies
using a model of private investment to address this hypothesis. The studies by Greene
and Villanueva [1991] for a panel of developing countries and Ramirez [2000] for a
panel of Latin American countries found that public investment stimulates private480 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
investment. Blejer and Khan [1984], Odedokun [1997] for a panel of developing coun-
tries, and Oshikoya [1994] for a panel of African countries presented evidence that
public infrastructure (represented by the expected public investment and/or its trend
level) has a positive impact while non-infrastructure investment (the unexpected com-
ponent and/or deviations from its trend) has a negative impact on private sector in-
vestment. Single-country studies, however, show more mixed results as to whether
public and private investment are complements or substitutes [Ramirez, 1994; Erenburg
and Wohar, 1995; Nazmi and Ramirez, 1997; Ghali, 1998; Apergis, 2000]. These stud-
ies use either a flexible accelerator model or an informal model of private investment
where the dynamic structure of private investment is defined as a partial adjustment
mechanism, and thus do not take advantage of the broad framework provided in the
literature of investment behavior and its dynamic structure.
This paper adds to the literature by examining a neoclassical investment model
within an error correction framework to investigate the link between public and pri-
vate investment. The model is modified to incorporate uncertainty, which affects pri-
vate investment because of the irreversibility of investment. Recent theoretical stud-
ies that model private investment behavior consider investment to be irreversible
because capital investments are often firm specific resulting in the sunk cost associ-
ated with the initial cost of investment [e.g., Abel, 1983; McDonald and Siegel, 1986;
Pindyck, 1991; Caballero, 1991; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; and Abel and Eberly, 1994;
1995a,b]. Public investment may play a role in reducing uncertainty by providing
complementary investment (e.g., infrastructure), by showing by example that invest-
ment in a country can be profitable, and by enhancing the operation of credit markets.
This paper incorporates the conditions of uncertainty into the framework by con-
structing an appropriate proxy, and makes a clear distinction between the short run
and long run effects of public investment. Finally, the paper addresses a potential
problem of spurious regression bias by performing cointegration tests. The results
show that there is a complementary relationship between public and private invest-
ment in developing countries both in the long run and short run.
THEORETICAL DISCUSSION AND SPECIFICATION OF EMPIRICAL
MODEL
Public and Private Investment
Many channels that relate public investment spending to private investment have
been identified in the literature [e.g., Buiter, 1977; Barth and Cordes, 1980; Aschauer,
1989; Ramirez, 1994; Erenburg and Wohar, 1995]. First, public investment may in-
crease aggregate output and thus enhance the physical and financial resources in the
economy. Second, public spending on infrastructure such as roads, highways, educa-
tion, sewer and water systems, and power plants often results in a reduction in costs
facing the private sector. Such infrastructure investments by the state complement
private investment, raising the productivity of private capital. However, there are
some cases in which public investment may negatively affect private investment. For
example, if the public and private sectors compete for the same resources in the481 THE LINKAGE BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INVESTMENT
economy, the costs of financing private investment increase while the availability of
credit to the private sector declines, which could crowd out investment in the private
sector. Furthermore, investments undertaken by highly subsidized state economic
enterprises are often financed through the printing press, external debts and deficit
spending. High fiscal deficits may reduce the available credits and/or raise interest
rates, crowding out the private sector from profitable investment opportunities. Fi-
nally, public investment may substitute for private investment when they both pro-
duce goods and services that are in direct competition in a marketplace, and especially
if public production is subsidized by the government. Public investment plays many
competing and offsetting roles in its effect on the investment activities of the private
sector, so the net effect of public investment on private investment is an empirical
question.
Irreversible Investment and Uncertainty
Analytical studies identify several competing mechanisms through which un-
certainty affects investment decisions. Dixit and Pindyck [1994] develop an option-
based model of irreversible investment under conditions of uncertainty where the
ability to delay an irreversible investment decision is similar to a financial call option.
The possibility of postponing an investment project has a cost as well as a benefit, but
the net effect is that uncertainty reduces the attractiveness of ex ante investment. In
contrast, Abel and Eberly [1995a; 1995b] argue that the negative effect of uncertainty
and irreversibility does not necessarily hold in the long run. Despite the short-run
disincentive to invest, there is a possibility of a “hangover effect” and thus irreversibil-
ity and uncertainty may result in a larger amount of investment in the long run.
Firms might want to sell some excess capital, but cannot exercise this option because
of irreversibility. Overall, the effect of uncertainty on investment is ambiguous on
theoretical grounds, again presenting an empirical question.
Empirical Model
The model developed here is a modification of the neoclassical model that incorpo-
rates the effects of public investment and uncertainty, and specifies the dynamic struc-
ture of private investment as an error correction mechanism. According to the neo-
classical model of investment, incorporating public capital into the optimization prob-
lem of a representative firm under certainty, the optimal or steady state level of the
private capital stock is expressed as a function of output, the user cost of capital, and
quantity of public capital [Sundararajan and Thakur, 1980; Ram, 1993],
(1) K*pt = F (Yt, Ct, Kgt )
However, under the conditions of uncertainty and irreversibility, this needs to be
modified with the inclusion of uncertainty because uncertainty may have an impact
on the long run equilibrium (steady-state level) as well as the short run dynamics of
private capital [e.g., Price, 1996]. Thus the equation becomes,482 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
(2) K*pt = H (Yt-1, Ct, Kgt , σt )
where σt is a measure of uncertainty. Because firms cannot instantaneously deter-
mine their output and the amount of capital demanded, output is lagged one period in
equation (2), which also addresses the potential problem of reverse causality between
output and private capital to some degree. Reverse causality is possible because while
countries with higher output demand more capital, countries with larger capital stocks
also have higher output levels or rates of economic growth. Given the potential for
reverse causality between PIt and Yt one can instrument for Yt to address the issue of
simultaneity bias. To this end, Yt-1 is used as an instrument for Yt because there will be
no simultaneity between PIt and Yt-1 . Thus, gross private investment is defined as
(3) PIt = (Kpt - Kpt-1) + δ Kpt-1
Because in the steady state K*pt = K*pt-1, equation (3) becomes,
(4) PI*t = δ K*pt
Thus, equation (4) also determines the long run equilibrium level of gross private
investment, which can be expressed as,
(5) PI*t = G (Yt-1, Ct, GIt , σt, δ)
where GI is gross public investment. This is obtained by implicitly assuming that
public capital, Kgt, depreciates at the same rate as private capital and that the depre-
ciation rate is time-invariant.
Because of technical constraints, and the time it takes to decide on, build and
install new capital, firms cannot instantaneously adjust their actual capital stock to
the desired level. A dynamic structure in private capital can be introduced by specify-
ing the cost of adjustment facing the firms in attempting to close the gap between the
actual and desired levels of private capital. By taking into account the growing target
level of private capital, Nickell [1985] considered a quadratic adjustment cost function
which can be expressed in gross private investment as the following form:
(6)  E {∑
∞
=1 i Ωi [ λ1 (PIt+i - PI*t+i )2 + (PIt+i - PIt+i-1 )2 – 2 λ2 (PIt+i - PIt+i-1 ) (PI*t+i – PI*t+i-1 )]}
where λ1 ,λ2 > 0 are parameters and Ω is the discount factor. PI*t+i represents the target
level of desired gross private investment for period (t+i). The first term in the brack-
ets indicates the cost of not being at the target level. The second term represents the
cost of changing the rate of investment. Finally, the last term indicates that the loss is
attenuated if the agent moves toward the growing desired level. The firm chooses a
sequence of PIt+i to minimize equation (6) given the information at time t, which yields483 THE LINKAGE BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INVESTMENT
a second-order difference equation. A detailed discussion of the solution to this prob-
lem is given by Nickell [1985, 120-122]. The solution to this difference equation yields,
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where Δ represents the first difference and μ is the only stable root in the solution of
the difference equation (⎥μ⎥ < 1). Note that equation (7) reduces to the forward looking
partial adjustment mechanism when λ2 = 0. Finally, E (PI*t+i ) represents the expected
future desired level of investment, which is assumed to have a unit root,
(8) E(PI*t+i ) = η + PI*t
where ηi is the drift term. Plugging equation (8) into (7) and rearranging yields
(9) ΔPIt = θ0 + θ1 ΔPI*t + θ2 (PI*t-1 - PIt-1)
where θ0 = (1-μ) (1-λ2) ηΩμ/ (1- μΩ) , θ1 = [1- μ (1-λ2) ], θ2 = 1-μ.
Further, the unobservable ΔPI*t term can be replaced with the first differences of
the right hand side variables of a linear approximation of equation (5). Hence the
equation becomes,
(10) ΔPIt = a0 + a1 ΔYt-1 + a2 ΔCt + a3 ΔGIt + a4 Δσt - θ2 (PI – PI* )t-1
This equation shows the short run dynamics of gross private investment, with the
last term representing the conventional error correction mechanism. Although the
steady state level of private investment, PI*, in the last term is unobservable, it may
be recovered by viewing equation (5) as a cointegrating relationship between actual
private investment, output, the cost of capital, public investment, and a measure of
uncertainty [Guncavdi et al., 1998]. Actual private investment, PI, is first substituted
for PI* in equation (5). The long run equilibrium level, PI*, is then proxied by the
predicted values from estimating a linear approximation of equation (5). As a result,
the last term (error correction term) in equation (10) is the lagged residuals from the






* ), a point that becomes clearer in the result section.
The availability of credit is a crucial determinant of private investment in develop-
ing countries. The credit constraint is more important in developing than developed
countries partly because equity markets are not as developed. In addition, controls
over interest rates and credit rationing in the financial markets of many developing
countries reduce the role of the interest rate in rationing credit while highlighting the
significance of credit availability. Therefore, most of the previous studies such as
Blejer and Khan [1984] and Ramirez [1994] include the amount of credit available to
private investors into the model. The availability of credit is likely to influence the484 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
adjustment of actual investment toward its desired level, altering only the short run
dynamics of private investment. The estimating equation then becomes,
(11)  ΔPIi,t = a0 + a1 ΔYi,t-1 + a2 ΔCi,t + a3 ΔGIi,t + a4 Δσi,t + a5 ΔCRDi,t - θ2 (PI – PI* )i,t-1 + vi,t
where ΔCRDt denotes the flow of external credits to private sector and vi,t is a random
disturbance. The subscripts i = 1,…, N and t = 1,…, T represent the cross-section and
time-series dimension of the panel data. θ2 is the error correction coefficient which
indicates the speed at which the private investment adjusts toward its long run equi-
librium in each short run period. A novel feature of this approach is that one can
estimate both the long run (from a linear approximation of equation (5)) and short run
(from equation (11)) dynamics of private investment.
Tests such as Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) can be applied to determine whether
the variables in equation (5) are co-integrated for each country in the sample. How-
ever, these tests are quite sensitive to the number of observations, and are not robust
when the data covers a short time span as is the case in this study [Coiteux and
Olivier, 2000]. Thus, no attempt is made to perform these tests for each individual
country in the sample. Instead, a t-test of the estimated q2 can be used to see whether
the error correction term is significantly negative [Guncavdi et al., 1998]. The finding
of a significant and negative adjustment coefficient can be taken as evidence that
there is a cointegrating relationship and that the error correction specification is well
defined. An alternative is to perform unit root tests with the pooled data as suggested
by Levin and Lin [1992, 1993]. If the residuals obtained from estimating equation (5)
do not have a unit root, then equation (5) is a cointegrating vector, which empirically
justifies the use of the error correction specification (11). Accordingly, a panel unit
root test, which is basically a panel version of Dickey-Fuller test for time series, is
performed by estimating the following regression,
(12) Δ εi,t = a + bi εi,t-1 + ξi,t
where Δ denotes the first difference operator and εi,t represents the residuals obtained
from estimating equation (5). ξi,t is a stationary disturbance term. To carry out the
panel unit root test, equation (12) is estimated by the pooled-OLS method because the
residuals are obtained from estimating the long run regression by the fixed effect
method, which eliminates the fixed country effects from the residuals. Entertaining
the null hypothesis that bi = 0 enables us to determine whether the residuals have a
unit root. If one rejects the null, then the residuals are stationary series. This means
that the variables of interest are co-integrated and equation (5) is a cointegrating
vector. Therefore, in the second stage, one can estimate equation (11), called the
Engle and Granger two step procedure [Engle and Granger, 1987].
Following this line of analysis, a linear approximation of equation (5) is estimated
by the FE estimator, from which the residuals are obtained. Then, using equation
(12), the panel unit root test on the residuals is performed to see whether the error
correction model can be justified empirically. It is, so the error correction model (equa-485 THE LINKAGE BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INVESTMENT
tion 11) is estimated. Because equation (11) is in first differences, which eliminates
country specific effects as well, it can be estimated using pooled-OLS or Fixed effect
specification. To see which estimator is preferable, an F-test is performed to test the
hypothesis that all constant terms are equal across countries.
Proxy for Uncertainty
The generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity specification
(GARCH) developed by Bollerslev (1986) has recently become a popular specification
for modeling volatility. The GARCH process captures an important part of reality by
assuming that uncertainty is time variant because it may be greater during the bad
states than during the good states of the economy. Following the lead of the studies by
Price [1995; 1996], Serven, [1998], and Dehn, [2000], a simple univariate model of
GARCH (1, 1) is specified to obtain uncertainty measures,
(13) xt = φ0 + φ1 t +φ2 xt-1 + υt ; t = 1,…, T;
(14) σ2
t = ζ0 +ζ1 υ2
t-1 + ζ2 σ2
t-1
where υt ~ N (0, σt ) and σ2
t shows the variance of υt conditioned on an information set
up to period t. Equation (13) is an AR(1) process with a deterministic time trend that
separates out the predictable and unpredictable components while equation (14) is a
GARCH(1,1) process that allows for heteroskedasticity in the unpredictable compo-
nent. The fitted values of the conditional variance from equation (14) provide a proxy
for uncertainty.
At this point, the volatility of what variable or variables, xt , are chosen to repre-
sent uncertainty becomes another important issue. Many macroeconomic variables
may be viewed as a source or an indicator of uncertainty. In this study, the rates of
inflation, output growth and the real exchange are taken as the main indicators of
overall macroeconomic instability. First, the conditional variances of these variables
are obtained from estimating the above GARCH process for each country. Second,
following the analysis of Serven [1998], a summary measure of uncertainty is con-
structed using the volatility measures (conditional variances of the variables in ques-
tion). To accomplish this, a principal component analysis is carried out for each coun-
try across time, which allows us to combine the volatility measures into a single proxy
that retains most of the variation in these measures. That is, this method looks for a
linear combination of highly correlated variables to yield principal components in a
way that accounts for the maximum variation in these variables. Therefore, the first
principal component of the volatility measures is used as a proxy for uncertainty.
Data Sources and Description of Variables
The main sources of the data are from Bouton and Sumlinski [2000] of the Inter-
national Finance Corporation of the World Bank, (B&S, IFC), the International Mon-
etary Fund, International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 2000 and 1999 issues (IFS).486 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
 The data on gross private and public fixed investment are obtained from B&S,
IFC that compiles the ratios of public and private investment to GDP for 50 developing
countries spanning from 1970 to 1998. Because some countries lack observations for
several years, 21 out of 50 have the complete data for 1970-1998 periods. However,
because of the data limitations on the other remaining variables compiled from IFS,
there are few countries (only 6) that have complete data for 1970-1998 periods. As a
result, we restrict the time span to the years 1980-1997, for which complete data for
19 developing countries are available (Bangladesh, Belize, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador,
Guatemala, India, Kenya, Korea, Malaysia, Malawi, Mauritius, Mexico, Pakistan,
Philippines, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, and Uruguay). Because of the diversity of
countries in the sample (4 from Africa, 7 from Western Hemisphere, and 8 from Asia
including Turkey), the country set appears to be fairly representative of developing
countries around the world. It is also worth noting that the panel is chosen to be
balanced, which requires complete data from each country that cover the same time span.
Output, Y, is proxied by real gross domestic product (GDP). Nominal GDP (taken
from IFS, line 99b) is converted into real GDP by the GDP deflator (taken from IFS,
line 99bi). Thus real GDP is expressed in national current prices in 1995. Only the
data on nominal GDP and GDP deflator for Turkey are taken from the national data
sources (the State Planning Organization of Turkey, 1997 issue). The dependent vari-
able, real gross private investment, PI, is obtained by multiplying the ratios of gross
private investment to GDP (taken from B&S, IFC) by real GDP. Real gross public
investment, GI, is calculated by multiplying the ratios of gross public investment to
GDP (taken from B&S, IFC) by real GDP. Nominal bank credit to the private sector
(taken from IFS, line 32d) is converted into real terms by the GDP deflator. Thus real
bank credit, CRD, is expressed in national current prices in 1995.
The uncertainty measure, σ, is the first principal components of the conditional
variances of the inflation rate, output growth (real GDP growth) rate and real ex-
change rate obtained from estimating GARCH (1, 1) process. The inflation rate is
calculated as the annual difference in the logs of the country’s consumer price index
(CPI taken from IFS, line 64), with base 1995=100. Due to the unavailability of com-
plete data on CPI for Bangladesh and Tunisia, the GDP deflator and PPI are used
respectively. The real exchange rates per US dollar are computed by the PPP condi-
tion that log REXC = log{EXC * [CPI(US) / CPI]} where EXC is nominal exchange rate
(taken from IFS, line ae) and CPI(US) is the consumer price index of the US with
base1995=100. The real GDP growth rate is computed as the annual difference in the
logarithm of the real GDP.
The user cost of capital, C, is proxied by the real interest rate which is calculated
using the formula log [(1+NINTt) / (1+INFt)] where INF and NINT denote respectively
inflation rate and nominal interest rate (taken from IFS, lines 60b, 60l, and 60). Un-
fortunately, the definitions of interest rates vary across countries due to the lack of
available data. The money market (commercial bank) rate for India, Malaysia,
Mauritius, Pakistan, Thailand, S. Africa, deposit rates for Bangladesh, Belize, Chile,
Guatemala, Korea, Malawi, Mexico, Philippines, Turkey, Uruguay, and discount rates
for Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Kenya, Tunisia are used.487 THE LINKAGE BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INVESTMENT
RESULTS
Measuring Uncertainty
The model treats the inflation rate, real exchange rate, and growth rate as poten-
tial sources of macroeconomic instability. To distinguish predictable and unpredict-
able components in these variables, equations (13) and (14) are estimated for each
variable and country in the sample. After obtaining the fitted values of the conditional
variances of these variables, a summary proxy for uncertainty is constructed to repre-
sent overall macroeconomic instability. A principal component analysis is performed
to weight the conditional variances of these variables for each country across time.
For the majority of countries, the first principal component has positive loadings on
the unpredictable component of each variable. The largest weights correspond respec-
tively to the inflation rate, real exchange rate and growth rate uncertainty measures.
Further, the first principal component accounts for around 60 percent of the variation
in the individual uncertainty measures. Overall, the first principal component ac-
counts for a high percentage of the variation in the conditional variances and has
positive loadings for the majority of the countries, which implies that the first princi-
pal component can be used as a summary measure of uncertainty.
Estimation Results
In order to justify and estimate the error correction model, we exploit the notion
that equation (5) represents a co-integrating relationship between actual private in-
vestment and the right-hand side variables. If they are co-integrated, this means that
they move together toward a steady-state equilibrium and hence equation (5) indi-
cates a stable long run equilibrium relationship that can be estimated by the conven-
tional estimation techniques. In this case, one can posit and estimate the error correc-
tion representation of the neoclassical model of private investment in the second
stage. The first stage, a linear approximation of the co-integrating (long-run equilib-
rium) equation (5), is estimated using the fixed effect specification, with all variables
converted to logs. The results are reported in Table 1. Before interpreting the results
reported in the table, one needs to investigate the question of whether these specifica-
tions can be taken as a co-integrating relationship because the two-step procedure is
valid if there is evidence of cointegration.
If the residuals from the long run relationship follow a stationary process, then
the variables of interest are co-integrated. To test whether the residuals have a ran-
dom walk, a panel unit root test on the residuals is performed using equation (12).
Because the conventional t critical values are not valid for a panel unit root test,
Levin and Lin [1992] obtained critical values under the null hypothesis that all slopes
across cross sectional units are equal to zero. When equation (12) is estimated by the
pooled-OLS, Levin and Lin critical values with 15 and 19 degrees of freedom at 1 and
5 percent levels of significance are respectively -2.64 and -1.94. The t statistic, -3.54, is
greater in absolute value than the critical values, leading to the rejection of the hy-488 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
pothesis that the residuals from the long run regressions have a unit root. Therefore,
one can conclude that the actual private investment and the right-hand side variables
in the long run equilibrium relationship are co-integrated.
TABLE 1
Long-run Equilibrium Relationship






Real Interest Rate t -0.198
(0.192)






Total Panel Observations 304
Balanced Sample 1982-1997
Number of Countries 19
Adjusted R2 0.996
D-W 1.29**
Notes: Asterisks (*), (**), and (***) indicate 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels respectively.
Figures in the parentheses are heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors.
a. Expressed in logarithms.
b. The first principal components of the conditional variances of the inflation rate, growth rate
and the log of exchange rate obtained from a univariate GARCH(1,1) process for each country
in the sample, as shown in Serven (1998).
Accordingly, the FE estimates in Table 1 can be interpreted as the coefficients
that represent the long-run relationship. However, one should not make statistical
inferences on the significance of the estimated coefficients because of the possibility of
autocorrelation. As seen from the FE estimates, the standard variables have correct
signs, suggesting that private investment is positively related to real output and nega-
tively to the real interest rate in the long run. The results also indicate that public
investment has a positive impact on private investment. Furthermore, the summary
measure of uncertainty carries a negative sign in the long run equilibrium relation-
ship.
Given evidence of co-integration, the lagged residuals obtained from the long-run
regression represent the deviations from long run equilibrium and correspond to the
error correction term (EC). The next step is to estimate the short run dynamics of
private investment, using the error correction model (equation 11). Table 2 reports
the pooled-OLS and FE estimates of the error correction model. First, note that the
estimated coefficients of the error correction terms in both regressions carry a nega-
tive sign and they are significant at 1 percent level. This can also be taken as evidence
that the variables defined in the cointegrating relationship move toward a stable long-
run equilibrium (Guncavdi et al., 1998). Also, the D-W statistics show the absence of a
first order serial correlation. The F statistic with 18 and 260 degrees of freedom indi-
cates that the hypothesis that all constant terms are equal cannot be rejected at any489 THE LINKAGE BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INVESTMENT
conventional level of significance, meaning that fixed country effects are insignificant.
Accordingly, the pooled-OLS estimator can be chosen as the preferred specification.
However, regardless of the specification of the country effects, the results are similar
in both columns of Table 2. As discussed earlier, the coefficient of the error correction
term represents the speed at which the actual private investment adjusts to its de-
sired (steady state) level. The speed of adjustment is estimated at around 39 percent,
which implies that 39 percent of the adjustment in the actual private investment
toward its long run level takes place within a year.
TABLE 2
Error Correction Model: Short-run Determinants of
Private Investment in Developing Countries
Dependent Variable: Balanced Sample: 1982-1997
DReal Private Investment t




D Real GDP t-1
a 0.148 0.148
(0.137) (0.149)
D Real Interest Rate t -0.102 -0.083
(0.209) (0.221)
D Real Public Investment t
a 0.274 0.265
(0.087)*** (0.087)***
D Uncertainty t -0.009 -0.008
(0.010) (0.009)
D Real Credit t
a 0.549 0.568
(0.109)*** (0.108)***
Error Correction (EC t-1) -0.394 -0.389
(0.089)*** (0.091)***
Total Panel Observations 285 285
Adjusted R2 0.56 0.537
D-W 1.98 2.01
F-stat (pooling) 0.72
Notes: Asterisks (***) indicates 1 percent significance level. Figures in the parentheses are
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors.
a. Expressed in logarithms.
 The signs of the variables accord with the theoretical expectations. While GDP,
the real interest rate, and uncertainty do not affect the short run dynamics of private
investment, public investment and credit availability have significant impacts on pri-
vate investment in the short run. Taken as a whole, real GDP has a strong accelera-
tor effect on private investment in developing countries in the long term. While the
real interest rate has no effect on the short run dynamics of private investment, the
results consistently indicate that the flow of real credit to the private sector affects
private investment in the short run. There are several potential explanations for this.
First, this finding supports the argument that the quantity constraints on bank credit,
resulting from the less developed financial markets in developing countries, have a
larger impact on private investment than the cost of capital. Second, private firms and
investors may not respond to the changes in real interest rate because of uncertainty490 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
surrounding the real cost of capital. The results also indicate that the summary mea-
sure of uncertainty captures the negative impact of overall macroeconomic instability
in developing countries only in the long run. The primary conclusion of this empirical
model is that there is strong evidence that public investment complements private
capital in the long run and short run, which is in agreement with the majority of the
earlier studies such as Blejer and Khan [1984], Greene and Villanueva [1991], Oshikoya
[1994], and Odedokun [1997].
CONCLUSION
An ongoing issue in the literature on investment in developing economies is the
impact of public investment on private investment. The previous literature has pro-
vided inconsistent results, and this study uses a panel data set of 19 developing coun-
tries from 1980 to 1997 to re-examine the issue, offering several econometric ad-
vances over previous studies. This study begins by deriving a reduced-form neoclassi-
cal model of private investment that allows the estimation of both the short-run and
long-run determinants of investment. The time series properties of the data can have
an effect on the estimates, and this study performed co-integration tests to confirm
that the data set represent a long-run co-intergrated relationship. The model also
incorporates a measure of macroeconomic uncertainty, which can affect private in-
vestment.
The main empirical result is that, in accordance with a substantial share of the
previous literature, public investment is complementary to private investment. The
results show that in the long run, a one percent increase in public investment will
result in an increase in private investment of about 0.54 percent. The short-run im-
pact is also positive, but about half as large. The results also show that the interest
rate does not have a statistically significant impact on the level of investment, but
that credit availability to the private sector does. This suggests that imperfections in
the credit market play a significant role in inhibiting private investment in developing
economies. Macroeconomic uncertainty also has a negative impact in the long run,
although its short-run impact is insignificant. From a policy perspective, these results
show the importance of public investment as a stimulus to private investment in
developing economies, and also show that, perhaps because of less-developed financial
institutions or because of financial regulations, the availability of credit is a constrain-
ing factor on private investment in developing economies.
NOTES
The authors gratefully acknowledge helpful comments from two anonymous reviewers of this
Journal, Charles Barrilleaux, David Rasmussen, and especially Stefan Norrbin.
REFERENCES
Abel, A. B. Optimal Investment under Uncertainty. American Economic Review, 1983, 228-233.
Abel, A. B. and Eberly, J. C. A Unified Model of Investment under Uncertainty. American Economic
Review, 1994, 1369-1384.491 THE LINKAGE BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INVESTMENT
____________. Optimal Investment with Costly Reversibility. NBER Working Paper Series, 1995a, no.
5091.
____________. The Effect of Irreversibility and Uncertainty on Capital Accumulation. NBER Working
Paper Series, 1995b, no. 5363.
Apergis, N. Public and Private Investments in Greece: Complementary or Substitute ‘Goods’? Bulletin
of Economic Research, 2000, 225-234.
Aschauer, D. A. Is Public Expenditure Productive? Journal of Monetary Economics, 1989, 177-200.
Barro, R. J. Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endogenous Growth. Journal of Political
Economy, 1990, 103-125.
Barth, J. R. and Cordes, J. Substitutability, Complementarity, and the Impact of Government
Spending on Economic Activity. Journal of Economics and Business, 1980, 235-242.
Blejer, M. and Khan, M. Government Policy and Private Investment in Developing Countries. IMF
Staff Papers, 1984, 379-403.
Bollerslev, T. Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity. Journal of Econometrics,
1986, 307-327.
Bouton, L. and Sumlinski, M. A., Trends in Private Investment in Developing Countries: Statistics
for 1970-1998. International Finance Corporation Discussion Paper, no. 41, 2000.
Buiter, W. H. ‘Crowding Out’ and the Effectiveness of Fiscal Policy. Journal of Public Economics,
1977, 309-328.
Caballero, R. J. On the Sign of the Investment-Uncertainty Relationship. American Economic Re-
view, 1991, 279-288.
Coiteux, M. and Olivier, S. The Saving Retention Coefficient in the Long Run and in the Short Run:
Evidence from Panel Data. Journal of Money and Finance, 2000, 535-548.
Dehn, J. Private Investment in Developing Countries: The Effects of Commodity Shocks and Uncer-
tainty. University of Oxford Working Paper Series, no. 11, 2000.
Dixit, A. and Pindyck, R. S. Investment Under Uncertainty. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1994.
Easterly, W. and Rebelo, S. Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth: An Empirical Investigation. Journal
of Macroeconomics, 1993, 417-458.
Engle, R. F. and Granger, C. W. Co-Integration and Error-Correction: Representation. Estimation
and Testing. Econometrica, 1987, 251-276.
Erenburg, S. J. and Wohar, M. Public and Private Investment: Are There Casual Linkages. Journal
of Macroeconomics, 1995, 1-30.
Evans, P. and Karras, G. Are Government Activities Productive? Evidence from a Panel of U.S.
States. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 1994a, 1-11.
____________. Is Government Capital Productive? Evidence from a Panel of Seven Countries. Journal
of Macroeconomics, 1994b, 271-279.
Ghali, K. H, Public Investment and Private Capital Formation in a Vector Error Correction Model of
Growth. Applied Economics, 1998, 837-844.
Greene, J. and Villanueva, D. Private Investment in Developing Countries: An Empirical Analysis.
IMF Staff Papers, 1991, 33-58.
Guncavdi, O., Bleaney, M., and Mckay, A. Financial Liberalization and Private Investment: Evi-
dence from Turkey. Journal of Development Economics,1998, 443-455.
International Monetary Fund. International Financial Statistics Yearbook. Washington, (2000
and 1999 issues).
Khan, M. and Reinhart, C. M. Private Investment and Economic Growth in Developing Countries.
World Development, 1990, 19-27.
Khan, M. and Kumar, M. S. Public and Private Investment and the Growth Process in Developing
Countries. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 1997, 69-88.
Levin, A. and Lin, C. Unit Root Tests in Panel Data: Asymptotic and Finite Sample Properties. UCSD
Discussion Paper no. 23, 1992.
____________. Unit Root Tests in Panel Data: New Results. UCSD Discussion Paper no. 56, 1993.
MacDonald, R. and Siegel, D. R. The Value of Waiting to Invest. Quarterly Journal of Economics,
1986, 707-727.
Munnell, A. H. Why has Productivity Growth Declined? Productivity and Public Investment, New
England Economic Review, 1990, 3-22.492 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
Nazmi, N. and Ramirez, M. D. Public and Private Investment and Economic Growth in Mexico.
Contemporary Economic Policy, 1997, 65-75.
Nickell, S. Error Correction, Partial Adjustment, and All That: An Expository Note. Oxford Bulletin of
Economics and Statistics, 1985, 119-129.
Odedokun, M. O. Relative Effects of Public Versus Private Investment Spending on Economic Effi-
ciency and Growth in Developing Countries. Applied Economics, 1997, 1325-1336.
Oshikoya, T. W. Macroeconomic Determinants of Domestic Private Investment in Africa: An Empiri-
cal Analysis. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 1994, 573-596.
Price, S. Aggregate Uncertainty, Capacity Utilisation and Manufacturing Investment. Applied Eco-
nomics, 1995, 147-154.
____________. Aggregate Uncertainty, Investment and Asymmetric Adjustment in the UK Manufac-
turing Sector, Applied Economics, 1996, 1369-1379.
Pindyck, R. S. Irreversibility, Uncertainty and Investment. Journal of Economic Literature, 1991,
1110-48.
Ram, M. Empirical Investment Equations for Developing Countries. in Striving for Growth after
Adjustment, edited by L. Serven and A. Solimano. World Bank Regional and Sectoral Studies,
1993.
Ramirez, M. D. Public and Private Investment in Mexico, 1950-90: An Empirical Analysis. Southern
Economic Journal, 1994, 1-17.
____________. Does Public Investment Enhance Productivity Growth in Mexico? A Cointegration
Analysis. Eastern Economic Journal, 1998, 63-82.
____________. The Impact of Public Investment on Private Investment Spending in Latin America:
1980-95. Atlantic Economic Journal, 2000, 210-225.
Serven, L. Macroeconomic Uncertainty and Private Investment in LDCs: An Empirical Investigation.
World Bank mimeo, 1998.
Sundararajan, V. and Thakur, S. Public Investment, Crowding Out, and Growth: A Dynamic Model
Applied to India and Korea. IMF Staff Papers, 1980, 814-855
State Planning Organization. Economic and Social Indicators: 1950-1997. Ankara, Turkey, 1997.
Tatom, J. A. Public Capital and Private Sector Performance. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review,
1991, 3-15.
____________. Paved with Good Intentions: The Mythical National Infrastructure Crisis. Cato Institute
Policy Analysis no. 196, 1993.